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 MACINNES, John.- ‘Baixa’ fecunditat i envelliment de la població a Escòcia. 
Resum.- Varis autors sostenen que Escòcia s’enfronta no només amb l’envelliment de la 
població, sinó també al declivi de la població degut als efectes nocius de les baixes taxes de 
fecunditat. Aquest article proposa, en canvi, que la tassa de fecunditat escocesa no 
comporta aquests problemes, i en conseqüència, no es precisa cap política natalista. 
S’argumenta que tant l’ ’envelliment poblacional’ com la ‘baixa’ fecunditat són assumptes 
positius, i que allò que és distintiu del cas escocès no és la escassetat de naixements, sinó 
un excés de defuncions prematures.  
Paraules clau.- Fecunditat, envelliment de la població, Escòcia. 
 
MACINNES, John.- ‘Baja’ fecundidad y envejecimiento de la población en Escocia. 
Resumen.- Varios autores sostienen que Escocia se enfrenta no sólo al envejecimiento de 
la población, sino también al declive de la población debido a los efectos nocivos de tasas 
bajas de fecundidad. Este artículo propone, al contrario, que la tasa de fecundidad escocés 
no supone tales problemas, y en consecuencia, que no se precisa ninguna política natalista. 
Se argumenta que tanto el ‘envejecimiento poblacional’ como la ‘baja’ fecundidad son 
asuntos positivos, y que lo que es distintivo del caso escocés no es la escasez de 
nacimientos, sino un exceso de defunciones prematuras. 
Palabras clave.- Fecundidad, envejecimiento de la población, Escocia. 
 
MACINNES, John.- ‘Low’ fertility and population replacement in Scotland. 
Abstract.- It has been argued that Scotland faces population ageing and decline that will 
have potentially serious economic and social consequences, and that the origin of these 
processes lie in its low and declining fertility rates. This paper argues that low fertility is 
not the problem it is purported to be, and that pro-natalism is both undesirable and 
unnecessary. It suggests that low fertility and population ageing are positive developments, 
and that what is distinctive about Scotland is not any shortage of births but an excess of 
early deaths. 
Keywords.- Fertility, population ageing , Scotland 
 
MACINNES, John.- ‘Basse’ fecondité et remplacement de la population en Écosse. 
Résumé.- Divers auteurs affirment que l’Écosse fait face à un vieillissement et à un déclin 
de population, qui pourraient avoir de sérieuses conséquences économiques et sociales, à 
cause des taux bas de fécondité. Cet article envisage, par contre, que la basse fécondité 
n’est pas le problème, et que les politiques natalistes ne sont ni désirables ni nécessaires. 
On suggère que la basse fécondité et le vieillissement de la population sont des éléments 
positifs, et que se qui différencie le cas écossais ce n’est pas un manque de naissances, mais 
un excès de morts prématurées.  
Mots clés.- Fécondité, vieillissement de la population, Écosse. 
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‘LOW’ FERTILITY AND POPULATION REPLACEMENT IN SCOTLAND 
 
John MacInnes 
 
‘The future never resembles the past’ (Keynes 1937:13) 
 
1.- Introduction 
Perhaps because of its surprisingly intimate relationship with state power and international 
relations, the study of fertility has been more prone than most to alarums and excursions. In 
a recent article on population projections, Wilson and Rees (2003) argue that Scotland’s 
‘most pressing demographic problem’ is ‘a rapidly ageing population due to a low and 
declining fertility rate… Scotland’s population will fail to become demographically 
sustainable unless current low fertility rises. The severity of the consequences of the 
current demographic trajectory on which Scotland is traveling do not seem to be fully 
appreciated in the UK demographic literature and in public debate.’ Since only fertility, 
rather than migration, will affect the future age-structure, ‘A large-scale pro-natalist 
initiative in Scotland should be given very serious consideration’ in order to avoid serious 
consequences for the Scottish economy ‘what Scotland really needs is a pro-natalist 
policy’. Their analysis is similar to that of Graham and Boyle (2003) and part of a much 
wider trend in the contemporary analysis of European population trends that identifies 
population ageing and decline as impending problems and low fertility as the culprit (see, 
e.g. Castles 2003, Chesnais 1998, Goldstein et al 2003, Grant et al 2004, Lesthaeghe 2001, 
Lutz et al 2003, Neyer 2003, Sleebos 2003). This article argues that this increasingly noisy 
consensus, very audible in the debate over pensions reform for example, is mistaken. As 
Graham and Boyle (2003) note, there has been little research specifically on Scotland, so 
that in what follows I also refer to relevant material from a UK and European context.  
Contemporary demography is a good example of the difficulty social science often has, 
paradoxically, in digesting the implications of its own analyses of social change. Trapped 
in the mentality of the past it addresses yesterday’s issues. In demography this reveals itself 
in two rather anachronistic assumptions: (1) that the maintenance (if not growth) of existing 
population levels is desirable and (2) that ‘below-replacement’ levels of fertility must be 
caused by some ‘blockage’, whether social, economic or psychological, that prevents those 
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who would really prefer to have more children realizing their desires. These assumptions 
reach across the political spectrum; from those who blame the atrophy of traditional 
morality and the family (Fukuyama 1999), to those who see the further collectivization of 
the costs of parenting as the solution (McDonald 2005). These two assumptions are also 
conservative. Like those that associate de-industrialisation, or a fall in the proportion of the 
workforce in agriculture with economic ‘decline’, they fail to realize that society has 
passed the historical stage where the struggle for population is a vital (MacInnes & Pérez 
2005). 
This article suggests that analyses of low fertility pay insufficient attention both to 
empirical history (we have been here, or somewhere like it, before) and to demographic 
theory. Population reproduction is about more than fertility (Henry 1965). The social 
determinants and consequences of fertility have changed and, unlike persons, populations 
never have and do not now ‘age’ (Peréz 2004). In the 1930s, as the effects of what came to 
be known as the demographic transition became clearer, there was much discussion of low 
fertility rates, not only because they were imagined to presage population decline, but 
because low fertility disproportionately affected the ‘better classes’ and thus the quality of 
countries ‘racial stock’ (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). Such fears motivated rather 
impressive social scientific advances in such areas as statistics and data collection through 
censuses and surveys (Szreter 1984, Soloway 1990). Ironically, most of this research was 
driven by eugenic and racist ideas about the inheritance of innate ability and the racial 
character of populations that only fell into disgrace when the full horror of the Holocaust 
became apparent. With hindsight it can be clearly seen that the conclusions drawn from this 
research owed more to the anxieties of its authors, persuaded of the perils or evils of low 
fertility, than dispassionate consideration of the data.  
Insofar as this research attempted demographic predictions it was usually wildly wrong. 
For example Warren Thompson, a key early theorist of the demographic transition, forecast 
that the population of Europe had probably reached its peak and was set to decline 
(Thompson 1929). It has since trebled. Contraception and ‘family limitation’ were held 
responsible for all manner of moral and medical decay and decline of patriotic 
responsibility. Such arguments may nowadays be confined to the wilder shores of some 
nevertheless powerful religious institutions (the beliefs and behaviour of believers is 
another matter) but their intellectual descendents are to be found in the increasingly popular 
idea that a collective interest in population replacement, the future fiscal sustainability of 
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the state and manageable ratios between those of working age and the ‘dependent’ old 
require the state to encourage higher fertility through the further socialization of the costs 
of rearing children. Just as eugenic ideas found support across the political spectrum, so 
today does the idea that sustaining fertility is a social good.  
This article suggests that it is far too early to conclude that either Scotland, or Europe, faces 
substantial population decline. Actual population decline started in Scotland a generation 
ago, with relatively little comment or concern. Should such decline continue it is not 
obviously bad. What is popularly called ‘population ageing’, with its attendant imagery of 
social sclerosis and decay, concerns changes in the age structure of the population that have 
been underway for a century. Such changes neither automatically worsen dependency 
ratios nor threaten the economy. If Scotland has a ‘pressing demographic problem’ that 
distinguishes it from either the rest of the UK or Europe it is not low fertility but high 
mortality - Scotland needs more ‘population ageing’ not less. I shall conclude that Scotland 
does not needs no pro-natalist policy, which is just as well, since the evidence shows them 
to be Canute like in their effectiveness. They are solutions that will not work to a problem 
that does not exist. 
 
2.- Empirical evidence about current fertility rates and plans in Scotland 
Table 1 shows births in Scotland in since 1946. The total period fertility rate (TFR) for 
Scotland in 2004 was 1.60 (its lowest ever level was 1.48, in 2002). The experience of 
Scotland, where the TFR has halved from its peak in 1964, is similar to other European 
countries. There are two factors behind this development. The first is the long term 
‘demographic transition’ to lower fertility and mortality rates which has accompanied 
economic development and the rise of ‘modern’ society. No industrialized country 
(including the US) has a TFR above replacement level (conventionally taken as 2.1) and 
the estimated TFR for the entire developing world declined to 3.1 in 2002. The second is 
the aftermath of the post-War ‘baby boom’ during which most Western countries 
experienced levels of nuptiality, low age at first birth and low voluntary infertility that were 
unprecedented and unlikely ever to return. The drift to lower fertility rates thus resumes a 
longer trend first visible in the 1930s and subject to much comment at the time.  
Scotland might stand out from other countries if fertility decline continued at its pre-2002 
rate while rates stabilized elsewhere (see Figure 1), but given the unpredictable character of 
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short term fluctuations in TFR, visible in Figure 1, there is no evidence yet of any such 
distinction emerging. To assume that a continued or accelerated decline in rates will occur 
(e.g. Wilson and Rees 2003) seems unwarranted, as does Graham and Boyle’s 
classification of Scotland as a country with ‘very low fertility’ on the strength of its TFR 
dipping below 1.5 for a single year. The Scottish TFR remains well above the EU average, 
it is substantially higher than rates experienced by the ‘lowest low’ fertility countries of 
Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece, but below rates enjoyed by the Scandinavian countries 
and France.  
 
Table 1.- Live Births, Scotland 1946-2004  
 
Year Births 
1946-50 101,222 
1951-55 91,366 
1956-60 98,663 
1961-65 102,642 
1966-70 93,033 
1971-75 75,541 
1976-80 65,758 
1981-85 66,422 
1986-90 65,544 
1991-95 63,571 
1994 61,656 
1995 60,051 
1996 59,296 
1997 59,440 
1998 57,319 
1999 55,147 
2000 53,076 
2001 52,527 
2002 51,270 
2003 52,432 
2004 53,957 
 
Source: General Register Office Scotland 
 
All measures of fertility have advantages and disadvantages. TFR is rather sensitive to 
changes in the timing of childbirth across the life course since it is a transversal measure of 
longitudinal behaviour (Boongarts & Feeney 1998). Since an important contemporary 
change is rise in age at first birth (sometimes referred to as ‘postponement’) combined with 
increasing fertility at later ages (sometimes referred to as ‘recuperation’) TFR 
overestimates fertility falls by failing to ‘measure’ recuperation – since such recuperation 
may or may not take place. Conversely, as ‘recuperation’ kicks in, the TFR may rise faster 
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than the underlying increase in fertility: a plausible interpretation of Scotland’s TFR 
performance in 2003 and 2004.  An alternative, more accurate, measure is the completed 
fertility rate (CFR). This has the substantial drawback that it can only be calculated on a 
retrospective basis once a cohort of women has reached the end of their fertile period 
(conventionally 45 years). Figure 2 shows this measure to be much less volatile than the 
TFR. It peaked at 2.63 in 1978 (compared to a peak of 3.09 for TFR in 1964) and currently 
stands at 1.90. CFR for the EU was 1.70 for the female cohort born in 1963. In this sense 
Scotland has relatively high fertility.  
 
Figure 1.- TFR Western Europe 1983 – 2002 
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Source: Council of Europe 
 
These falls in realized fertility have been accompanied by much smaller falls in ‘desired’ 
family size (Goldstein et al 2003), which continues to be around two in Europe, so that 
Chesnais (1998) argues that this gap represents a ‘latent demand for family support’ 
comparable to that which earlier existed for reliable contraception. To my knowledge there 
is no data on ‘ideal’ number of children available for Scotland, however the quality of such 
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survey data is, to say the least, debatable. Most people are rather vague about their fertility 
intentions (Hobcraft 2004, Irwin 2000) and there is little evidence of any robust link 
between intention and result over any but the very short term (MacInnes 2004). Potential 
parents are usually asked how many children they would prefer to have. To take this as a 
measure of the actual ‘demand’ for children is rather like asking respondents how much 
they would like to earn, what size of house they would prefer, or what make of car they 
would like to drive.  People reveal their preferences in their behaviour: choosing, within the 
constraints that face them, between devoting time and resources to study, leisure, 
employment, domestic tasks and inter alia, having children.  
 
Figure 2.- Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) for 
Scotland, 1968-2001 
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Source: Council of Europe 
 
The General Household Survey does ask women under fifty about their fertility history and 
asks whether ‘you think that you will have any (more) children’ and how many children do 
you think you will have born to you in all including those you already have had already.’ 
This question wording has the considerable merit of pointing respondents towards practical 
results rather than ideal preferences, but detailed analysis of results from England and 
Wales suggest that it still leads respondents to over-estimate their eventual fertility 
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(Smallwood and Jeffries 2003) and Simons (1978) argues that respondents still answer 
such question wording with reference to norms about acceptable family sizes rather than 
their own preferences and situation. Using this measure, women under 50 in Scotland in 
2003/4 who gave definite answers to the question (i.e. excluding don’t know’s) estimated 
their eventual completed fertility at just under 1.91. 
 
3.- Possible Causes of long term low fertility 
As Wilson and Rees note, there is no consensus about the likely future trend of fertility 
rates in advanced industrial societies, nor agreement about the causes of their decline or 
what variables might best explain temporal or spatial variation; although no-one expects 
any general return to ‘replacement’ levels of fertility in the foreseeable future (;Caldwell 
1982; Coale 1986; Van de Kaa 1987; Mason 1997; Chesnais 1998; Lesthaeghe and 
Willems 1999; Frejka and Calot 2001; Frejka and Ross 2001; Lesthaeghe 2001; McDonald 
2001; Caldwell and Shindlmayr 2003; Demeny 2003). Research has begun relatively 
recently; data sources that link demographic behaviour to social or economic status or 
social attitudes are sparse, and aggravated by the need to concentrate analysis on 
comparatively brief periods in the life course of men and women, so that conventional 
survey samples often prove too small for accurate analysis. The limited number of ‘cases’ 
(countries) makes comparative macro analysis an imprecise tool as well as a theoretical 
minefield. It is easy to mis-use transversal comparisons across countries at a given point in 
time to produce over-optimistic conclusions about the future course of fertility within 
countries over time. Thus analyses that use such cross country comparisons to reveal a 
‘reversal’ in the relationship between women’s employment and fertility over recent years 
(e.g. Castles 2003) confuse social change with a compositional effect caused by the later 
fall in fertility in Southern European countries with lower female participation rates. 
Finally some issues (such as the evolution of desired and completed family size over time) 
require longitudinal research that yields results only in the future, or is forced to rely on 
respondent recall with its associated biases. However there are five factors that shape 
contemporary discussion. 
 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations from GHS 2003-4, respondents resident in Scotland. 
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3.1.- Timing 
Part of the fertility fall is associated with childbirth timing: the rise in age at first birth. This 
is associated in turn with higher age at partnership formation, although the increase in 
cohabitation and associated changes in forms of partnership make this more difficult to 
measure. Timing is often discussed in terms of ‘postponement’, but this rather misleadingly 
implies a former ‘normal’ age for first births. A second element is the decline of higher 
parities (i.e. large families) in part because of fall in the time period between first birth and 
age-based decline in fertility for women. Timing is related to changes in gender relations, 
the labour market and ‘marriage market’:  
(1) An increase in alternatives to motherhood for women, (more equal opportunities 
in education and employment). 
(2) A slower change in the amount of men’s involvement in unpaid domestic labour 
including childcare. 
(3) A perception of increasing absolute and relative costs of children (see below). 
(4) Trend rises in skill and qualification levels in employment with associated rises in 
education and training times and time spent ‘establishing’ a career. 
(5) Increase in the age of emancipation of young people from the parental home. 
Actual or potential parents (in the sense of people with some desire for children) may 
require longer periods than in the past to establish the (rising) standard of living thought 
necessary to form a family. They may also be more demanding about their choice of 
partner. However the definition of such ‘economic conditions’ is highly variable, and may 
well be inversely related to potential parents’ affluence, i.e. those with low incomes or 
other dimensions of economic insecurity may nevertheless have higher fertility rates. 
Research on voluntary childlessness based on Eurobarometer and FFS surveys (MacInnes 
2004) suggests that a relatively small proportion of those without children consciously 
planned to have none from an early age. More important is ‘postponement’: the decision 
not to have a child in the immediate future which gradually, and not necessarily 
accompanied by any explicit recognition, becomes the postponement of childbearing 
beyond the end of a respondent’s fertile years. Such research also suggests that ‘work-life 
balance’ or other economic issues (income, housing) rarely feature in respondents’ 
accounts of voluntary childlessness or restriction of family size. More important is civil 
status (though this tells us nothing about the direction of cause and effect) and problems in 
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a partnership. This directly contradicts other social attitude survey evidence, however, in 
which respondents overwhelmingly attribute falls in family size in general (as opposed to 
their own personal experience) to ‘economic reasons’.  Timing raises the relevance of 
public knowledge of the relationship between women’s age and fertility. While public 
knowledge of contraception may be good, knowledge about the rate at which women’s 
fertility declines with age may be less developed so that postponement may sometimes 
inadvertently become involuntary childlessness (Toulemon 1996).  
 
3.2.- Changes in Gender Relations 
To the extent that women have increased alternatives to motherhood we might expect 
fertility to decline. In addition values of gender equality are intimately linked to those of 
individual self realization (Giddens 1991, 1992) that might both reduce the desire for 
children and increase their perceived costs, insofar as they are now seen as individuals who 
must be endowed with the capacity to direct their own self refelxive life-projects in the 
future. In the longer term this might be seen as part of the move away from patriarchal 
societies with strong household economies in which the benefits of fertility largely accrued 
to men while the costs were born by women. Rises in separation and divorce rates, since 
they increase the risk of family breakdown, may depress fertility rates. Only longitudinal 
evidence can identify the linkages between marriage, cohabitation and fertility, since the 
shift between these statuses often anticipates fertility decisions, or results from them, rather 
than simply being antecedent causal factors. It may be relevant that the countries in Europe 
with the lowest low fertility rates all have strong institutional patriarchal traditions, and 
McDonald, amongst others has suggested that these now act as a break on fertility. 
However, drawing such a conclusion depends upon making the conceptual leap from 
transversal evidence to longitudinal conclusions that we criticized above. 
 
3.3.- The costs of children 
Opinion poll evidence shows that when asked in general terms (as opposed to their own 
behaviour), overwhelming majorities of respondents cite the increasing cost of children as 
the main reason for falling fertility. Most demographic literature agrees with the 
qualification that increasing opportunity costs are emphasised, particularly for mothers with 
labour market careers, rather than direct costs. It is frequently argued (e.g. Becker 1991) 
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that any savings flowing from the reduced number of children has been offset by an 
increase in their ‘quality’: more per capita time and money investment has increased the 
cost of children. Work-life balance studies have suggested that it is more difficult to 
coordinate parenting with employment in an increasingly mobile society, and some studies 
have suggested that parents devote increasing amounts of time to children. This evidence of 
the increasing cost of children is put alongside evidence of unfulfilled or latent demand for 
children to conclude that low fertility is a function of the increasing cost of children, so that 
greater state support and re-distribution of these costs could raise fertility. 
Such arguments are not new. Alva Myrdal (1968 [1939]) put the case eloquently and 
comprehensively sixty years ago, and her arguments formed the basis of the Scandinavian 
model of the welfare state. Unlike many of her contemporaries she realized that gender 
inequality was unsustainable in the long run in the labour market, and therefore also in 
parenting. Changes in the nature of employment, the family and the state were therefore 
needed. The second thing to note is that it is unlikely that the direct costs of having a child 
have risen in real terms over the course of the twentieth century. States have absorbed a 
rising proportion of the costs of children through tax breaks, child benefits, subsidized 
maternal or parental leave or other income transfers, and the provision of services, such as 
nurseries, education and health care. Technological innovation has cheapened almost all the 
goods consumed in the course of parenting, reduced the amount of time input necessary 
(e.g. disposable nappies, prepared foods, automatic washing machines) and created new 
technological possibilities (the early morning video; baby alarms).  
Childcare supervision is a highly unusual but important example of a ‘technologically non 
progressive activity’ (Baumol 1967). Its relative (but not absolute) cost therefore rises in 
proportion to the general level of technological innovation. Furthermore, almost uniquely 
in modern society, it is a status-specific physically non-alienable activity. That is the 
identity of the person doing it is paramount (a child would suffer if it did not know, from 
one day to the next who was caring for it, regardless of the level of competency and 
expertise of the carer) and their physical presence is important. While this explains the very 
severe limits to any ‘industrialisation of the family’, it is also important because of its links 
to the economics of time (Becker 1965, Linder 1970). As the cost of time increases with 
the general economic prosperity, the opportunity cost of parental childcare increases, as 
well as itself becoming more ‘cumbersome’ (Myrdal 1968 [1939]) in a social and economic 
context that prioritises flexibility and mobility.  
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However, any such rise in children’s opportunity cost, principally due to the rising value of 
time in a society with a widening range of productive and consumption activities, is simply 
part of the general rise in the opportunity cost of any time consuming activity that occurs as 
the result of such economic progress (Becker 1965, Linder 1970). It cannot, of its own, 
explain any general decline in fertility, since the opportunity cost of other activities, in 
terms of children ‘foregone’ in order to undertake them, must also have risen. What rising 
opportunity costs tell us is that potential parents in affluent societies have other priorities 
than devoting large amounts of their increasing resources and higher living standards to 
producing more children. Given that children are usually seen as an end in themselves, and 
human life is not seen as something that ought routinely to be accounted for in monetary 
terms, it is socially more acceptable to represent such choices between alternative 
opportunities as ‘the rising cost of children’.  
 
3.4.-Changes in social attitudes and values 
Changes in social attitudes are argued to have undermined the ‘traditional’ family, and 
some of its elements such as marriage or the authority of the husband. It may also be the 
case that an increasing conscious of risk and social change predispose individuals against 
long term (e.g. marriage) or irreversible (e.g. parenthood) commitments. However any such 
transformation of intimacy (Giddens 1992) or increase in individualization or move to 
‘post-materialist values’ (Van de Kaa 1997, Inglehart 1997) is occurring against high and 
rising levels of support in principle for the family as an institution, the importance of 
partnership and desirability of children, at least as measured by social attitude survey data. 
Although substantial attention has been paid to values, it is equally plausible to regard them 
as the result of demographic change, rather than its cause. 
 
3.5.- Work-life balance, the reconciliation of work and family life and family 
friendliness 
Policy and research attention has been paid to ‘work–life balance’ policies for obvious 
reasons, but any robust connection between the latter and fertility rates (as opposed to 
female employment rates) has proved elusive (OECD 2001, Sleebos 2003). Within Britain, 
there is a relation, although not strong, between presence of children, time stress and 
subjective perception of work-life imbalance. But there is also no relation between 
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presence of children and demand for reduced working hours. Respondents give a rather 
positive evaluation of employers’ sensitivity to childcare commitments (possibly due to 
rather low expectations) and the results cast doubt on any ability to characterize 
respondents as primarily committed to employment or to the family (MacInnes, 2005).  
A key, but largely unnoticed development, is that in Britain, as in other countries, the 
employment rate for mothers has increased more slowly than the decrease in the percentage 
of women of working age who are mothers (what might be thought of as the parenting rate 
of workers) so that the proportion of the workforce who are mothers of dependent children 
has fallen slightly, while the proportion of the male workforce who are fathers of dependent 
children has fallen from around one half to one third over the last thirty years. The 
bargaining weight of parents within the workforce may therefore have declined. Demand 
for work–life balance policies may come from older workers, with less outgoings and 
family commitments, who prefer to substitute income for leisure.  
 
4.- Do children cost more?  
If we review these elements of the debate, a common theme emerges that demographers, 
economists and sociologists have perhaps been slow to grasp. Most potential parents, 
especially mothers, now face a much greater range of life opportunities, and have the 
educational and other resources to pursue them, while they also enjoy far greater freedom 
in their reproductive and non-reproductive sexual behaviour. Can we seriously suppose that 
a family in a welfare state, with universal education, a public health system, a commitment 
to various forms of employment protection for women who become pregnant and for 
others, and a standard of living that equips most households with a wide range of time-
saving consumer durables, faces greater difficulties in realizing a desire to have children 
than, say, its nineteenth or eighteenth century equivalent, let alone its predecessors of the 
‘baby boom’ years? For example, in the Britain of the early 1950s, when the boom 
commenced, fewer than a half of all households had a washing machine, an electric cooker, 
a fridge, or electric water heater.   
Merely to pose the question in these terms is to realize how profound the change in the 
social relations of fertility has been. Today, in Europe, having a child is a matter of private, 
largely un-coerced choice, albeit one that brings with it (like most ‘free’ decisions) a range 
of costs and risks, some of which are more foreseeable than others. It is easy to forget how 
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recent the historical shift has been, not only to the ability to personally plan fertility reliably 
and cheaply, but to the idea that it is something than might be personally planned at all. 
Until well into the last century church, state, patriarchal interest and social norms 
encouraged women to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ and sexual behaviour was subject to strict 
legal sanction that is only now disappearing.  However, though they sometimes might wish 
to try, neither church nor state can easily re-enter the bedroom once it has been defined as a 
private rather than public space.  
 
5.- Is fertility management possible in a democratic society? 
Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that higher fertility rates were desirable, we 
would still have to show that they could be achieved. There is little robust evidence of pro-
natalist policies successfully raising fertility rates, and plenty examples of failure, or 
contradictory policy instruments. For example at the same time as Franco’s Spain sought to 
boost fertility by restricting mother’s employment, Mussolini’s Italy pursued the same aim 
by promoting it. The Scandinavian or French states might be taken as an example of the 
ability to sustain fertility rates over the longer term. However, any attempt to identify a 
causal link between state policy and fertility change faces a mass of prior and intervening 
variables to contend with. We might plausibly expect measures such as substantial state 
expenditure on public pre-school childcare, public education and health systems, regulation 
and subsidy for maternity and parental leaves at replacement earnings, benefits or tax 
breaks for those with children to alter the relative cost of children and thus promote 
fertility. If such a clear link existed, we would surely have found it long ago. Consider the 
cases of Portugal or the USA. Neither country offers much support to parents. Consider too 
France and Sweden: countries with very different social policies but which have 
nevertheless been inspired by a desire to sustain fertility. Figure 3 shows that it is far from 
clear that the fertility ‘performance’ of Sweden and France has been superior to Portugal 
and the USA. There is also controversy over the extent to which such state involvement 
may prove self-defeating in the very long term. Some commentators relate the recent 
volatility in Swedish fertility rates (visible in Figure 1) to their increased sensitivity to 
changes in state support.  
Consider next those countries, aside from France, that McDonald (2005) claims to have had 
some success in raising fertility: Hungary (in the 1960s), and the German Democratic 
Republic (1970s). Presumably modestly forbade mention of Rumania. Facing a TFR of 
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1.80 in 1966, government measures achieved no less than double that rate one year later 
(according to official statistics). Fertility then declined steadily till the mid 1980s at which 
point another pro-natalist initiative was introduced which proved ineffective. How was 
such change possible? Until the 1960s abortion was in practice, a widely used method of 
contraception. It was banned without warning in November 1966. Access was restricted to 
other forms of contraception and to divorce. Tax, maternity, housing and retirement 
benefits were offered for those having children. In the ensuing chaos, infant and maternal 
mortality rose, in part because the sudden baby boom had as one of its (predictable) results 
a large increase in the proportion of obstetricians on maternity leave. The 1984 pro-natalist 
initiative, which bore little fruit, once again restricted abortion while publicity campaigns 
promoted having children as ‘a high honour and a patriotic duty’ (Teitelbaum and Winter 
1985, 100-102).  
 
Figure 3.- Total Fertility Rate, selected countries 1960 – 2000 
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One conclusion that might be drawn from all this is that natalist policies ultimately depend 
on two approaches. One is direct state control of reproductive behaviour. There is little 
doubt that this is effective. One only has to look at the world prior to the demographic 
transition, and the near universal patriarchal control of sexual behaviour by church and 
state to see that this could indeed deliver high fertility at the considerable price of the tight 
regulation of women’s (and to a lesser extent men’s) behaviour. This is not a world we 
should aspire to re-create. The other approach is to modify the resource context in which 
people make decisions about children so as to make more and earlier births a more 
attractive option for potential parents. The success of this approach in turn depends upon 
the existence of significant blocks to higher fertility in the form of time or resource 
constraints. It is not surprising therefore, that a wealth of social demographic literature and 
enquiry has proceeded on the popular assumption that the relative direct or opportunity 
costs of children have risen in contemporary Europe. Were this the case, we might expect 
government intervention to further socialize the costs of parenting to be costly but 
ultimately effective.  
However, an alternative, and perhaps more plausible explanation is that fertility decline 
represents less the increasing cost of children than a declining ‘demand’ for them.  In 
contemporary society fertility can and does fall, because people can now afford not to have 
children, while far fewer children are actually necessary to reproduce population. They 
have other priorities for themselves, as well as higher aspirations for those children that 
they do decide to have. This liberation from the heavy burden and (for women) risky nature 
of reproductive labour was a fundamental and revolutionary achievement of the twentieth 
century for much of the world, based on unprecedented falls in mortality (Pérez Diaz 
2004). We should not let assumptions about fertility rates forged prior to this revolution 
continue to shape policy after it has occurred, and instead take full advantage of the 
positive social changes this democratization of longevity has bequeathed us.  
 
6.- Possible consequences of long-term low fertility. 
Long-term low fertility, along with continued decreases in mortality, raises the twin 
spectres of population decline and changes in the age structure of the population. The latter 
increases the support ratio of the number of people of economically active age 
(conventionally 15 - 64) compared to the ‘dependent’ elderly of 65+ years (although it 
reduces the support ratio for the dependent young). Both these consequences have often 
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produced unduly alarmist reactions, both in contemporary political debate, and in the 1930s 
when the shift to lower fertility rates first became apparent (Spengler 1926, Davis 1937, 
Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). However there are three important points to bear in mind. 
First, the bulk of population ageing has, in fact, already occurred. As shown in Figure 4, 
the proportion of the population aged over 64 in Scotland roughly trebled across the 
twentieth century (from 5.4% in 1911 to 15.2% in 2000), and on current GAD projections, 
might double across the twenty-first. On Wilson and Rees’s most ‘pessimistic’ scenario the 
over 64’s might represent 38.5% of Scotland’s population in 2101. Raising fertility rates 
now, were that possible, would have much less impact on this process than Wilson and 
Rees’s discussion might lead us to expect. On their own figures a reduction of six 
percentage points in the population over 64 would be matched by a similar increase in the 
population under nineteen.  
 
Figure 4.- Scotland: population aged > 64: 1911-2002 
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The main force driving changes in dependency ratios is the long-term impact of the 
demographic transition itself. This transition has reduced the proportion of young people 
(defined here as those under 15) in the Scottish population across the twentieth century 
from a third to a little over a sixth. As a result the overall support ratio (expressed as the 
ratio of those aged 15 to 64 to the rest of the population) has actually been improving 
slightly, as has the ratio of those in employment to all others (Figure 5).  
However, does it makes any sense to use age to calculate ‘dependency’. This may have had 
some logic when most workers were men, most entered the labour force at 16, left it at 65 
and worked full-time. It makes none at all when employment rates are driven by other 
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factors. Working hours are continually dropping, so that increasing numbers of people 
enjoy shorter working weeks, longer and more frequent holidays and shorter careers. 
Workers stay in education longer, enter employment later and retire earlier: few remain 
active in their 60s (OECD 2004). Globalisation has not slowed this long-term trend. 
Women’s employment rates in Europe have almost doubled as a proportion of men’s over 
the last forty years (MacInnes 2006). Age structures capture none of these trends, which 
have been made possible by the same continuous increase in labour productivity that has 
driven up the value and opportunity cost of time. They also ignore what might be thought 
of as the social construction of age (Pérez Diaz 2003; Laslett 1991).  
 
Figure 5.- Scotland: support ratio and employment support ratio: 1911-2002 
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Most ‘dependent’ over 64’s are in good health. The Rolling Stones may qualify for bus 
passes but this does not stop them touring. Their peers provide less visible but large and 
increasing amounts of time, resources and money to younger, employed, family members. 
Grandparents do more childcare. Increases in life expectancy have increased the proportion 
of dependent children with surviving grandparents and other older relatives who are 
healthy enough to take an active part in their care. The UK Millenium Cohort Study of 
babies born in 2000 (Centre for Longitudinal Studies 2004) was undertaken when they 
were aged around nine months. Sixty per cent of these infants had all four grandparents 
alive when they were born. These grandparents were the single most important source of 
childcare after parents themselves. Two thirds of parents relied on them most for childcare 
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outside of work hours, while one third used them as their main childcarers while they were 
at work2. Any trend decline in ‘real’ as opposed to age based support ratios, could surely 
easily covered by productivity increase. There is one qualification to bear in mind. 
Increased longevity may not be fully matched by increased health expectancy, so that a 
greater proportion of older people may require greater expenditure on health care. 
Finally, ‘population ageing’ is not really a concept but a (misleading) metaphor. 
Populations do not age, individuals do. Individuals die. Populations do so only when, 
species become extinct. It is empirically false to assert that a shift in the demographic 
weight of a population to older age categories is equivalent to the life course ageing of an 
individual. The phrase has a different origin. Rarely is the issue of supporting the growing 
volume of ageing dependents presented as a family issue, since people may see the 
longevity of their own parents or grandparents as a matter for celebration rather than 
concern. Rather the issue is framed in terms of the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.  
Since it is easy to imply that an increase in the proportion of the elderly must mean an 
increase in the volume of state support to this group, ‘population ageing’ arguments are 
frequently used to imply that in the face of this new demographic challenge, the welfare 
state must cut its cloth to suit its shrinking capacities. However it may well be that the 
reverse is true. Increased life expectancy will create more complex issues of 
intergenerational transfers of resources. Only two institutions can undertake such transfer: 
the family and the state, and only the latter can do so in a way that does not increase social 
inequality.  
 
7.- Scotland’s demographic problem: not enough old people? 
Like many demographic analyses that erroneously reduce reproduction to fertility, Wilson 
and Rees ignore mortality, even thought they assume its continued improvement in their 
projections (in my view correctly). However, surely most divergence of Scottish 
demography trends from the rest of Britain is due to the inability of some parts of Scotland 
to achieve what we might call ‘lowest low’ mortality typical of the rest of Europe. This 
brings us to another key theoretical problem in the approach of Wilson and Rees, and many 
other analyses of low fertility: which is to see ‘population ageing’ as a result, when it might 
just as well be theorised as the ultimate cause of low fertility. In Scotland, life expectancy 
                                                 
2 Author’s calculations from MCS first wave 
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at birth rose by twenty years in the first half of the last century, and another ten years in the 
second half. Until not much more than a century ago in much of Europe, women with an 
average life expectancy of around 35-40 years bearing four or five surviving children might 
devote half or more of their adult lives to intensive infant care. 
  
Figure 6.- Life Expectancy at birth, Scotland and England and Wales, 1991-2004 
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Now women face a life expectancy of 75-80 years, and if they bear two children might 
devote around 5% of their adult lives to such activity. These children in turn will 
themselves lead longer, more productive, and reproductive lives. Indeed it is too often 
forgotten that this is what the entire demographic transition has been about: a 
democratization of longevity widespread enough to permit population stability or growth 
net of migration with less than half the fertility rate typical of pre-transition societies. Such 
reproductive efficiency has not only fuelled economic growth by releasing resources for 
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production, but by dramatically reducing the social impact of the biological division of 
labour in reproduction, created the conditions for greater sexual equality.  
Figure 6 shows that life expectancy at birth in Scotland is doing little to close the gap with 
England and Wales. Moreover, some areas of Scotland do far worse than the average. The 
standardized mortality ratio for Glasgow is one quarter higher than the average for Scotland 
(GROS 2004). Life expectancy for men and women in Scotland is some two years below 
that for England and Wales and around four years below some other countries in the 
European Union. Closing this gap (which would paradoxically ‘worsen’ population ageing) 
would significantly delay the onset of population decline.   
 
8.- The choice between migration and fertility  
In common with many others, Wilson and Rees argue that while migration might influence 
the level of population, it has little effect on its age-structure, so that it is no substitute for 
natalism. Coleman (2002) uses the latest UN population estimates and projections to 
demonstrate that in order to preserve the present age structure of South Korea in the face of 
declining fertility, the entire population of the world would have to migrate there before the 
end of this century. However this argument does not follow, if, as we have suggested, there 
is no good reason to seek to preserve this, or any other, age structure of the population. 
Should fertility fall so low that employers faced a shortage of labour, there is no shortfall of 
potential migrants anxious to take them. 
However, the preference for fertility goes beyond demographers’ knowledge of age 
structures to more general beliefs about migration as such. While affluent, mostly white, 
citizens of developed Western countries virtually take for granted their ability to move 
elsewhere, they are often more circumspect about the right of ‘others’, especially those 
from poorer countries, or with black skins, to settle here. Here too there are insights from 
demographic theory as well as instructive parallels with the past. In its translation from 
biology to demography, the term ‘population’ undergoes a little noticed inflexion in 
meaning that changes the sense of the term profoundly when used in the plural. There is a 
global population, singular, of human beings, whose size depends on global births and 
deaths. Populations, plural, associated with administrative and political units (states, world 
regions, cities, local authority areas etc.) are the fruit of administrative artifice rather than 
demographic dynamics. Migration is the act of crossing an administrative frontier (and not 
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infrequently its inverse, when people located in a particular space find themselves 
circumscribed by new or re-drawn boundaries).  
What is important is how these frontiers are socially constructed and represented. If we 
choose to imagine them as growing organically to circumscribe definable ‘populations’, 
plural, comprising definable ‘peoples’ we are well on the road to a racialised vision of the 
world. Here is Karl Pearson, founder of world’s first statistics dept, admired by Einstein, 
socialist (he refused an OBE and Knighthood), feminist, Honorary Fellow of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh and eugenicist: 
My view, and I think it may be called the scientific view, of a nation, is that of an 
organized whole, kept up to a high pitch of internal efficiency by insuring that its numbers 
are substantially recruited from the better stocks, and kept up to a high pitch of external 
efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with inferior races…No degenerate and feeble 
stock will ever be converted into healthy and sound stock by the accumulated effects of 
education, good laws, and sanitary surroundings. Such means may render the individual 
members of a stock passable if not strong members of society, but the same process will 
have to be gone through again and again with their offspring, and this in ever-widening 
circles, if the stock, owing to the conditions in which society has placed it, is able to 
increase its numbers.(1919: 36-7, 1892: 26-7) 
Such an explicitly racist view of the world became less possible after the Holocaust. 
However it continues to underlie any approach that equates administratively constructed 
‘populations’ with distinct peoples. To argue that the long term stability of the Scottish 
population is better based on fertility than migration is to fall, consciously or not, into the 
argument that the Scots, qua Scots, comprise a distinct ‘people’, or ultimately ‘race’ whose 
numbers merit protection (despite their own reproductive choices) analogous to some 
endangered species. Logically, to erect too hard a distinction between migration and 
fertility returns to precisely those eugenic arguments deployed a century ago with reference 
to race. Few demographers would claim there to be any shortage of global population. Thus 
any justification of a natalist policy at sub-global level must rely upon the argument that the 
human race is composed of qualitatively different elements, whose ‘replacement’, 
regardless of global population trends, or the reproductive behaviour of that ‘people’ itself, 
is desirable. 
As well as a scientific question, fertility is a matter of popular rhetoric and public debate 
that tends to latch on to any alarmist imagery that, unfortunately, academics may 
 22
sometimes employ without sufficient caution. This can be seen in newspaper headlines 
such as ‘Scots face birthrate ‘disaster’’ (Scotsman 14 September 2002); ‘Scotland’s 
population crisis set to deepen’ (Scotsman 14 April 2004); ‘Pay up or die out’ (The Herald 
6 April 2004); ‘Falling population threatens living standards’ (Sunday Herald 11 January 
2004); ‘Scotland is emptying’ (Scotland on Sunday 4 January 2004). The first political 
party to draw attention to the fertility regime in Scotland was, in fact, not the Scottish 
National Party, but the British National Party whose then Scottish organiser Peter Appelby 
penned a piece entitled ‘Scotland’s future is in our bedrooms’ which attributing Scotland’s 
falling birth rate to the rising cost of children. This is only what we might expect. Natalism 
has often been seen by ethnic nationalism, and more often than not by other nationalisms 
too, as its fundamental policy (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). It would be unfortunate if 
public debate about demography was distracted by unduly exaggerated claims about the 
imminence or importance of severe population decline, or the supposed malevolent effects 
of immigration.  
 
9.- Is population size a legitimate policy goal? 
In a context where almost ten per cent of the current Scottish population was born 
elsewhere in the UK, and the equivalent of sixteen per cent were born in Scotland but now 
live in other parts, anything but the most general management of population trends will be 
difficult. Short of closing the border how could immigrants be required to settle in 
Scotland? However, this must lead us to demographic pessimism only if we believe that the 
population size of a state (or in Scotland’s case, constituent part of a state) is both a 
necessary and legitimate goal of government policy. Many commentators in the 1930s 
sought to link population expansion with economic growth, including Keynes (1937) in, of 
all places, the Eugenics Review. However any such link has never been clearly 
demonstrated and the economic and social impact of stable or slowly declining populations 
has not hitherto been the subject of much research. As Coleman (2002) reports, UK, Dutch 
and German government inquiries in the 1970s and 1980s failed to conclude that stable or 
slowly declining population levels constituted a serious problem. Wilson and Rees’s low 
fertility projections still leave Scotland with a population of some 3.5 million a century 
hence: hardly catastrophe or disaster, simply one aspect of social change that will 
inevitably be overwhelmed by others that we cannot yet even imagine. 
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10.- Conclusions 
It is important to remain conscious of the status of projections in demography. By this I do 
not mean that they are speculative or imprecise, although that is also true. I mean that they 
are a rhetorical device that seeks to invest our partial analysis of the present with the 
overarching authority of the future, rather like turns of phrase such ‘future generations will 
judge us by…’ or ‘historians will look back and say…’. No methodology provides such a 
crystal ball. The demographers of 1905 imagined the world of 2001 with as much insight as 
we possess about 2101. Other social changes will transform the significance of the 
population estimates we might make for such periods far more than any trend in population 
itself. This does not mean that population should not be an object of study and policy. We 
do need to plan for the future as well as the present. Migration needs to be properly 
managed. There is ample space for family policies that ensure that having children is 
straightforward for all who wish them, or health policies that do not leave older sub-fertile 
patients with a waiting list of self-defeating length for treatment. However we do little to 
facilitate such planning if we do not balance the creativity of our demographic imaginations 
with sober judgment. While the long-term future of fertility is a matter for speculation, on 
current trends it seems very unlikely to fall so far as to require problematically high rates of 
immigration to sustain Scotland’s population. Indeed, the years 2003 and 2004 saw rather 
significant increases in the number of births. Hospital delivery rooms are hardly empty. 
Scotland needs no pro-natalist policy. 
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